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Preface 
 
 
 
The Doha round of trade negotiations that is ongoing under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) since 2001 has been called 'Development Agenda'. Indonesia is one of those devel-
oping countries seeking, more than ever before, to participate actively in the negotiation 
process. As a major agricultural importer and exporter, the country has a major stake in 
global efforts to liberalise agricultural trade. This paper assesses the Indonesian interests in 
the agricultural negotiations. 
 The Ministry of International Cooperation (DGIS) of the Netherlands sponsored this 
research through the PBSI programme, the programme for bilateral cooperation between 
Indonesia and the Netherlands. The research was implemented within the project 'Strength-
ening Agricultural Policies', a capacity building project targeted at enhancing Indonesian's 
capacity to develop and pursue international trade policies aimed at economic growth and 
development. The project brought together policy advisors and researchers from the Minis-
try of Agriculture in Indonesia with their counterparts at the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Nature and Food Quality in the Netherlands, and at Wageningen University and Research 
Center.  
 Many thanks to the participants of a seminar at the Indonesian Center for Agricul-
tural Socio Economic Research and Development (ICASERD) in Bogor on 9 November 
2004, for providing the authors with useful suggestions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof. Dr. L.C. Zachariasse 
Director General LEI B.V. 
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Summary 
 
 
 
This paper takes the 'July 2004 package' as a starting point to assess Indonesian interests in 
the agricultural negotiations under the WTO Doha Development Agenda. Since the start of 
the Doha round in 2001 the scope for liberalisation in agricultural trade has gradually de-
clined, and Members agree on far reaching exemptions from reforms in individual products 
(special products for developing countries and sensitive products for developed countries). 
The ambitions on reforming domestic support in OECD countries seem to be moderate, at 
best, and a number of developing countries are less inclined to open their markets through 
improved access. This paper uses a large-scale economic model of trade and production 
(GTAP) to identify the possible impact of a realistic global liberalisation scenario in the 
spirit of the 'July 2004 package' on the Indonesian economy. Given the prevailing quite 
liberal trade regime in Indonesia the expected overall impacts on national income, trade 
and production are positive, but rather limited. For Indonesian agriculture global liberalisa-
tion offers positive prospects for vegetable oils and for animal products, while small 
adverse impacts on the protected rice and sugar sectors can be expected. Further analysis 
of a Safeguard Mechanism for rice reveals that temporary (seasonal) tariffs may be able to 
cushion the domestic rice sector against world price drops against moderate economy-wide 
costs. Even without a Safeguard Mechanism, the current binding overhang, i.e. the spread 
between the bond tariffs and actually applied tariffs, is large enough to allow Indonesia 
enough flexibility to shield domestic markets against an influx of cheap imports. The paper 
also analyses policies aimed self-sufficiency in sugar. We conclude that such a policy 
would entail very high macro-economic costs, as huge subsidies would be needed to move 
resources from other activities into sugar production.  
 10
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
This paper discusses the interests of Indonesia in the agricultural negotiations under the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) of the WTO. It uses a global model of trade and pro-
duction to quantitatively assess the possible effects of a successful Doha round on the 
world and on the Indonesian economy.  
 Since the start of the Doha round in 2001 the scope for liberalisation in agricultural 
trade has gradually declined. The recent 'July 2004 package' reveals that WTO members 
agree on far reaching exemptions from reforms in individual products (special products for 
developing countries and sensitive products for developed countries). The ambitions on re-
forming domestic support in OECD countries seem to be moderate, at best, and a number 
of developing countries is less inclined to open their markets through improved access.  
 It is against this background that we formulate our DDA scenario, and subsequently 
perform additional calculations to investigate some specific issues relating to Indonesian 
rice and sugar policies. In particular, we look into the effects of volatility in international 
rice markets in the post-DDA world, and how Indonesia might mitigate the possible nega-
tive consequences of downward price movements in the face of the great importance of 
rice for the rural economy. We also investigate costs and benefits of policy measures 
aimed at sugar self-sufficiency. 
 Several recent studies have shown that agricultural market access is one of the most 
important issues on the Doha development-round agenda (e.g. Anderson, 2004; Bouët et 
al., 2004b; Francois et al., 2003; World Bank, 2003). There is also much focus on tariff re-
ductions in the present paper. Chapter 2 provides background to the Doha Development 
Agenda, and provides input into the discussions on tariff reduction formulae through an 
analysis at tariff-line level. We find that any formula that reduces post-UR bound rates by 
less than 80 per cent will leave most currently applied tariffs on agricultural imports into 
Indonesian untouched. Stated otherwise, Indonesia brings much capital to the negotiation 
table when it comes to improving other countries' access to its markets.  
 This study employs the GTAP model and database, and gives much detail on the ag-
ricultural sectors in Indonesia, and the South and East Asian region (chapter 2). While the 
impact of the Doha Development Agenda on global income is modest, as reported in chap-
ter 3, Indonesia is one of the countries that reap above-average gains driven by the 
improved export performance in agriculture. The income form farming activities will rise. 
The export opportunities compensate by far the limited contraction of the rice and sugar 
sectors that occur as imports grow; designating rice a Special Product will counteract con-
traction at modest costs to exports. Criteria design for SPs is a potential deadlock, 
however, that may consume much of the scarce negotiating resources that developing 
countries have at their disposal. 
 The Indonesian government may want to manage the impact of world markets on the 
domestic sugar and rice economy in order to pursue domestic policy objectives relating to 
rural development, food security, etc. Most economists agree that the outright banning of 
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imports is a bad idea. Instead, we analyse tariff policies inspired by a strategic safeguard 
mechanism (SSM) in chapter 4, and find that an SSM provides effective protection at lim-
ited costs to society, and thus provides a proper alternative to policy makers if binding 
overhang is reduced. Chapter 5 concludes that there are firm interests for Indonesia in the 
Doha Development Agenda, some of which are on the defensive side, i.e. those that relate 
to defending flexibility for trade policies on key commodities. There are even larger offen-
sive interests when it comes to the creation of market opportunities for Indonesian exports. 
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2. Protection, model and scenarios 
 
 
 
2.1 Starting point: the global patterns of protection in agriculture 
 
The Doha Development Round aims to obtain 'substantial improvement of market access, 
reduction of all export subsidies, in view of their progressive withdrawal, and substantial 
reduction of domestic support having effects on trade distortion'. These are the three 'pil-
lars' in the agriculture negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda: market access 
concerns reductions in tariffs and tariff rate quotas; domestic support concerns commit-
ments to reduce trade-distorting farm income policies; export competition concerns the 
promotion of agricultural exports through direct subsidies, export credits, subsidy element 
in food aid and state trading enterprises. 
 
2.1.1 Domestic support 
 
Domestic support to agriculture is monitored in the WTO according to the concept of the 
Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), and member countries have agreed to bind and re-
duce their domestic support in the last multilateral trade round, the Uruguay Round (UR). 
The domestic support ceilings have never been binding since the UR for any member, 
partly due to the relatively soft definition of AMS that allows reallocation of expenditures 
between categories.1 Most importantly, a significant part of domestic support has been 
shifted to the so-called 'Green box' which contains support that is considered minimally 
trade distorting and is not subject to reductions. Similarly, the so-called 'blue box', used 
mainly by the EU, has not been subject to reductions, and might possibly be extended in 
the DDA. Bringing down AMS will, therefore, not always result in actual reduction in do-
mestic support. 
 Table 2.1 provides data on the subsidies from farm-income policies and export com-
petition for selected countries and regions. These data are drawn from the OECD's 
estimates of producer support and adjusted to fit the GTAP database.2 A negative number 
refers to a net tax on producers in that sector. It is evident that the European Union, North 
America (USA and Canada), Japan and Korea choose to subsidise their agricultural sec-
tors, while most of the developing countries are taxing their farmers.  
                                                 
1 Tangermann (1998) provides a discussion on these issues. 
2 The data does not include the so called 'Market Price Support' component, and is therefore lower than the 
OECD's Producer Support Estimates (PSE). 
 Table 2.1 Domestic support and export competition a) b) 
 
 
 Indo- ASEAN China P.R. Japan India EU-25 North Brazil South and  Australia and All other 
 nesia   and   America  Central New Zealand countries 
    Korea     America 
 
 
Million USD 2001 
 
Rice -63 -413 -1,369 1,760 1,681 86 978 -29 -4 4 200 
Sugar -197 -169 -37 -37 -41 30 234 -140 -95 54 -249 
Oilseeds -10 -2 -155 224 597 3,712 5,337 73 -66 10 -142 
Grains -10 -213 -196 39 146 8,639 7,837 23 1,178 27 90 
Vegetable Oils -55 -107 -254 -11 -54 -194 -1 -222 -31 0 -64 
Animal Products -88 -450 -1,913 961 -166 12,896 5,879 -444 -1,112 521 -2,030 
Other agriculture  -89 -413 -2,789 1,691 3,166 10,514 15,088 108 275 181 -2,650 
Food processing -1,095 -4,287 -14,590 -42,172 -546 -15,571 -221 -1,090 -3,823 -210 -3,388 
 
% of value of output 
 
Rice -1 -2 -3 3 6 3 25 -1 0 1 0 
Sugar -7 -4 -2 0 0 0 1 -2 -1 2 -1 
Oilseeds -1 0 -2 35 3 42 27 1 -1 2 -1 
Grains -1 -11 -2 8 3 61 32 1 11 3 0 
Vegetable Oils -1 -1 -4 0 -1 0 0 -3 0 0 0 
Animal Products -1 -2 -2 1 0 3 2 -1 -1 1 -1 
Other agriculture  -1 -2 -2 3 5 9 18 1 0 1 -1 
Food processing -7 -13 -13 -19 -4 -4 0 -3 -3 -1 -2 
 
 
a) Data is based on OECD producer support estimate (PSE), which measures trade distorting support for a good through the difference between the world 
price and its domestic price. Numbers do not directly relate to government budgets. See the annual Monitoring and Evaluation Report by the OECD Secre-
tariat. 
b) Negative number means a net tax; positive number means a net subsidy. 
Source: GTAP version 6.4 pre-release (October 2004), calculations LEI. 
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2.1.2 Export subsidies 
 
Export subsidies have received much criticism from academics and policymakers, and are 
widely believed to be amongst the most trade distorting forms of policies. The issue has re-
ceived high priority in the current Doha round of negotiations. Between the kick-off of the 
round with the Doha ministerial declaration (WTO, 2001) and the latest general council 
decision of July 2004 (WTO, 2004), the wording on export subsidies has changed from 
'…reductions of, with a view of phasing out ...' to a much more ambitious '… ensure the 
parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies..'. This signals a broad consensus that 
export subsidies will have to disappear over time.  
 Export subsidies are generally a consequence of domestic policy arrangement that 
aim at stabilising and increasing domestic prices in agriculture. The European Union's 
(EU) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides a case in point. The CAP initially 
shielded the EU from imports through prohibitive tariffs, allowing the successful imple-
mentation of domestic market policies, which subsequently led to excess supply in key 
commodities. This excess supply had to be removed from the EU market in order to main-
tain high domestic prices, and this eventually required a disposition of surpluses on world 
markets at subsidised prices. 
 Under the UR only direct subsidies were subject to discipline. While taking the re-
moval of subsidies further, the DDA also addresses indirect forms of subsidisation through 
various forms of institutional arrangements. These include food aid, officially supported 
export credits and state trading enterprises (STEs). The General Council decision (WTO, 
2004) calls for the elimination of all forms of export subsidies, and Members have been in-
structed to work with the OECD to develop monitoring tools. The OECD (2000) study on 
export credits is the forerunner of much more work in this area. 
 Table 2.2 shows the notified usage of direct export subsidies between 1995- 2000. 
On average countries have been spending more than USD 7 billion annually on direct ex-
port subsidies, totalling 36 billion over the implementation period 1995-00. Of that total, 
almost 90 per cent (33 billion) are from the EU, making this region by far the largest user 
of direct export subsidies, but also the region with the sharpest reduction in budget outlays 
on export subsidies. The USA notified only USD 487 million of direct export subsidies, 
but according to OECD (2000), the USA has been the largest user of export credits to sub-
sidise exports.  
 It is noteworthy that there are also positive notifications by developing countries, six 
of which did not make reduction commitments in the UR because they did not use them at 
the time. These countries are India, Korea, Morocco, Pakistan, Thailand and Tunisia. 
 In volume terms, grains represent the largest category of subsidised exports, whereas 
dairy products are the largest in value terms. With a few exceptions, countries have gener-
ally been able to stay clear of their value bindings, but volume bindings for some 
commodities have been more of a problem in some instances. Volume constraints on dairy 
products (mainly form the EU) have been the closest to become binding over the years. 
Skimmed milk powder and pig meat saw subsidised export volumes in excess of agreed 
levels in 1999.  
 Export subsidies display a considerable volatility over the years. The amount of ex-
port subsidies depends on the vagaries of world markets, in combination with the desire of 
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some countries to stabilise their own domestic markets. In value terms the volatility is even 
greater, since an additional price component enters the picture. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Export subsidy notifications (USD million) 
 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
 
 
Members with export subsidy reduction commitments 
 
Australia 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 - - 0 
Bulgaria 0 - 0 0 0 - 0 
Canada 38 4 0 0 - - 42 
Colombia 18 22 25 23 0 0 88 
Costa Rica 0 0 105 123 20 - 248 
Cyprus 3 3 2 4 0 - 12 
Czech Republic 40 42 40 42 35 24 223 
EC 6,292 6,684 4,915 5,835 5,588 3,048 32,362 
Hungary 41 18 10 12 13 - 94 
Iceland 6 1 0 0 0 - 7 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Israel 19 13 6 1 1 0 40 
Mexico 0 0 36 4 - - 40 
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
Norway 83 78 102 77 128 - 468 
Poland 0 16 9 14 55 36 130 
Romania 0 0 0 2 7 - 9 
Slovak Republic 8 8 13 12 12 12 65 
South Africa 40 42 18 3 5 3 111 
Switzerland-Liecht. 447 369 295 292 - - 1,403 
Turkey 30 17 39 29 28 27 170 
United States 26 122 112 147 80 - 487 
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
Venezuela 3 20 2 5 - - 30 
 
TOTAL 7,094 7,459 5,729 6,626 5,974 3,150 36,032 
 
 
Notes: The number for the EC in 2000 comes from: EU WTO Notification (New and Full Notification Pur-
suant to Article XVI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, G/SCM/95/EEC), exchange rate used EUR-US = 0.8956. 
Source: Author's calculation based on WTO (2002a). 
 
 
2.1.3 Market access 
 
Countries protect their domestic markets in a number of ways. The resulting pattern of pro-
tection measures is often complex and faces the exporter with a non-transparent 
administrative burden, involving tariffs, quota, technical standards, sanitary and phytosani-
tary standards, import licenses, infrastructure charges, and, increasingly popular after the 
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UR, anti-dumping duties. All these measures tend to raise the domestic price in of the im-
ported good above its 'world' price, i.e. the price that the exporter actually receives.  
 
Tariffs 
Tariffs are the most commonly applied form of import protection. Market access negotia-
tions in the GATT/WTO have generally been based on tariff bindings, or schedules of 
concessions tabled under GATT rules that define a maximum or ceiling rate for trade re-
strictions. The coverage and level of these bindings is an important element of the initial 
conditions for the negotiations. While tariffs in the OECD (and Latin America) are gener-
ally bound, many Asian and African economy tariffs remain unbound despite more than a 
four-fold increase in the coverage of developing-country tariff bindings in the Uruguay 
Round.  
 Tariffs on industrial goods in OECD countries have been subject to negotiated reduc-
tions since the 1950s, but agricultural tariffs have only been included in the multilateral 
agreements since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994. With the implementation 
of Uruguay Round commitments, average ad valorem tariffs in the industrial countries 
generally are around 3 per cent. However, there are important exceptions. One of these is 
textiles and clothing, where the average rate is roughly three times this overall average. 
The other exception is agriculture, which we discuss more thoroughly below.  
 For both industrial tariffs and agricultural tariffs, the phenomenon that bound rates 
exceed applied rates, or 'binding overhang' (Francois and Martin, 2003) is an important 
element for the initial negotiations in the Doha round. The binding overhang may reduce 
the effectiveness of bound tariff reductions. For example, Francois et al. (2003) show that, 
in general, for developing countries, binding overhang is large enough that reductions in 
the range of 50 per cent are necessary to force any reductions at all in average applied rates 
for countries like Brazil. 
 In agricultural trade the use of non-ad valorem tariffs is widespread, sometimes in 
conjunction with quota. In fact countries levy tariffs in a number of different ways: 
- As a per centage of the value of imports (ad valorem tariffs), the most straightforward 
form of a tariff; 
- As a monetary amount per unit of import such as cents per ton (specific tariffs);  
- As a combination of the two, such as 12.5 per cent plus 20 cents per ton (compound 
tariffs). 
 
 Tariffs may also vary based on the time of year (seasonal tariffs). Seasonal tariffs are 
widely applied on EU imports of horticultural products, which essentially open 'import 
windows' in exactly those periods when domestic production in the EU is low, and close 
the window through prohibitive tariffs when domestic production is high. Tariffs may also 
be determined by complex technical factors such as sugar or alcohol content. 
 Specific tariffs are widespread in agriculture. In the USA and the EU about 44 per 
cent of the agricultural tariff lines are specified in non-ad valorem terms. One advantage of 
specific duties, from the importer's perspective, is their administrative simplicity, since 
they avoid the problem of having to value imports. However, specific tariffs tend to dis-
criminate against low-quality goods, as they place a heavier burden on lower priced items 
within a given tariff-line. Since developing country imports are often of a lower quality, 
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and lower priced, than comparable goods originating from industrialised countries, specific 
tariffs tend to disadvantage developing country exporters.  
 Contrary to ad valorem tariffs, the distorting effect of specific duties is difficult to 
determine. To estimate the ad valorem equivalent (AVE) of a specific tariff one needs 
transaction volumes as well as prices. The latter are usually difficult to obtain and typically 
display variations over time, in part due to exchange rate fluctuations.  
 Gibson et al. (2001) estimate the average of bound agricultural tariffs across 113 
countries specified solely in ad valorem terms to be 58 per cent, while the average AVE of 
non-ad valorem tariffs is 123 per cent.  
 
Tariff-rate quota 
The Uruguay Round negotiations resulted in 'tariffication', which is the process of convert-
ing agricultural non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Variable import levies and import quotas were 
converted into bound tariffs (maximum tariffs set at established rates). Tariffication re-
sulted in a more transparent tariff-based system of border protection that allowed for an 
initial set of tariff cuts.  
 Since the conversion of NTBs into tariffs could lead to prohibitively high tariffs, 
GATT members agreed to provide a minimum level of import opportunities for products 
previously protected by NTBs. This was accomplished by creating tariff-rate quotas 
(TRQs), which generally impose a relatively low tariff (in-quota) on imports up to a speci-
fied level, with imports above that level subject to a higher tariff (over-quota).  
 According to Gibson et al. (2001) only about 6 per cent of the agricultural tariff lines 
are subject to TRQs, and 33 out of the 133 countries in their study use this instrument. 
However, TRQs are typically applied in 'sensitive' products, meats, dairy and cereals, and 
therefore are a significant factor in global trade. The effects of TRQs are difficult to ascer-
tain, as either the in-quota tariff, the quota level or the out-of quota tariff may be binding. 
In addition, the process of administration and the allocation of the TRQ to specific export-
ers contribute to the non-transparency of the system. As with any quantitative market 
restriction, TRQs give rise quota rents, that may accrue to the importer, the exporter or is 
shared amongst them (De Gorter, 2001). 
 The average over-quota tariff in Gibson et al. (2001) equals 128 per cent, with peaks 
running as high as 250 per cent. This shows that countries tend to use TRQs on products 
that they whish to protect from international competition.  
 
Preferences 
While the negotiation in the GATT/WTO concern market access conditions on a Most Fa-
voured Nation (MFN) basis, i.e. non-discrimination amongst trading partners, a web of 
preferential agreements governs most South-North trade (GSP, ACP, EBA, AGOA etc.). 
These agreements typically provide preferential access, i.e. at lower than MFN rates, to in-
dustrialised markets, but often 'sensitive' agricultural products are excluded from such 
agreements. The existence of preferences implies a priori that multilateral reductions on an 
MFN basis reduce the value of these preferences, see Bouët et al. (2004b) for an empirical 
study, and Achterbosch et al. (2004) for an analysis for Africa.  
 However, there are big questions as to the utilisation of preferences. Low utilisation 
rates may result from administrative complexity, and associated costs, information defi-
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ciencies and from complex rules of origin. Since preferential trade agreements provide 
member countries reductions on tariffs, rules of origin are needed in order to establish 
whether a given good is actually eligible for duty reductions. These rules of origin are usu-
ally extremely detailed and complex, and may contribute to the low level of preference 
utilisation. 
 Obviously, if preferences are not effectively utilised to begin with, then erosion is 
less of an issue. Instead, preferential regimes should be more transparent and less restric-
tive. For example rules of origin should be simplified (Augier et al., 2004). 
 
 
2.2 Measuring import protection  
 
2.2.1 The global post-Uruguay Round tariff structure  
 
With all the usual caveats on providing aggregate measures of trade protection, we present 
here estimates of applied trade protection for broad country groups. Estimated tariffs are 
from the MacMaps database which is a joint effort by the Centre d'études Prospectives et 
d'information Internationales (CEPII) and the International Trade Centre (WTO/ITC). This 
database is used to convert tariffs applying to trade in products measured at a very disag-
gregate level (HS6) into their ad valorem equivalent. The import protection measures 
include ad valorem tariffs, specific tariffs, quota, tariff rate quota regimes, and anti-
dumping duties. An important feature of this dataset is its inclusion of existing trade pref-
erences, including GSP, ACP, AGOA and existing bilateral preferences. See Bouët et al. 
(2004a) for a comprehensive documentation. 
 Figure 2.1 provides a summary view of the tariff landscape. It compares the simple 
average across products of ad valorem tariff equivalents levied by a country group (on their 
imports) to the average tariff faced (by their exporters) in this country group.1  
                                                 
1 It is generally difficult to derive a good measure of average tariffs. One well-known problem relates to the 
use of trade weights. If tariffs are weighted by their corresponding trade flows, the average tends to be low-
ered in case very high tariffs prohibit trade to occur (the endogeneity problem). On the other hand, simple 
average may put too much weight on high tariffs if the corresponding trade flow is rather small. In our case, 
the averages are somewhat hybrid: first, the original data is aggregated from the HS-6 level using basically 
unweighted averages to arrive at averages per GTAP commodity (see Bouët et al., 2004). From the GTAP 
commodity level, we calculate the trade-weighted averages for all products and all regions, using bilateral 
imports as weighting factor, and excluding intra-regional trade. This takes into account the importance of a 
particular trade flow between any pair of trading partners. We then proceed to calculate simple unweighted 
averages across products. An alternative measure would be the calculation of import duties (and quota rents) 
collected.  
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Figure 2.1 Average tariffs imposed and average tariffs faced by exporters 
Source: GTAP database 6.3 (pre-release, June 2004), calculations LEI. 
 
 
 On average, trade barriers on agri-food products are higher than those on manufac-
turing products, and this holds for all countries and country groups considered. Note that 
we have included tariffs on textiles and clothing in the calculations for the manufacturing 
products, which raises the averages in this product group. The average ad valorem tariff on 
industrial goods alone in OECD countries is currently reduced to about 3 per cent. The de-
veloping countries included in the chart tend to impose higher tariffs on their 
manufacturing imports than on agri-food products, reflecting their tendency to protect capi-
tal-intensive activities.  
 In agri-food, the average tariffs levied by non-OECD countries appear to be smaller 
than the tariffs that their exporters have to pay, but there are exceptions to that rule. India, 
for example imposes higher protection on its imports of agri-food products, and Sub-
Saharan Africa imposes relatively high protection on manufacturing imports while its ex-
porters encounter low tariffs on their export destinations. This mainly reflects the 
preferential trade agreements with the EU. 
 Within the OECD countries there is some variation in the tariff profiles. Generally, 
the agri-food exporters Australia and New Zealand charge low tariffs on food imports. 
Canada protects mainly its dairy markets and this is reflected in a comparatively high aver-
age tariff. On the other hand, the average agri-food tariffs in the EU-15 are above 20 per 
cent, and those for Japan are on average in excess of 90 per cent, reflecting the extremely 
high protection in the rice market, ruminant meat and sugar. Since most trade occurs be-
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tween OECD economies, the agricultural exporters face high tariffs on average on their 
export markets.  
 In summary, the picture emerging is that developing countries tend to protect their 
manufacturing more than their agriculture. However, within the group of developing coun-
tries, the picture is mixed. Some face higher tariffs than others on their export markets, 
reflecting existing preferential agreements. Also, the patterns of protection afforded to their 
domestic producers through trade barriers differ, and it is impossible to infer a priori con-
clusions as to the likely effects of globally lower trade barriers. 
 For Indonesia we observe that its applied protection in 2001 is low on average, 
around 5 per cent in agri-food and slightly higher in manufacturing and textiles. We also 
see that the protection afforded is lower than the protection faced by Indonesian exporters, 
which points to potential export revenue gains from a multilateral reduction of tariffs.  
 
2.2.2 Patterns of border protection in Indonesia 
 
The current pattern of border protection in Indonesia, its profile of bound rates and its pro-
file of applied rates determine the potential impact of the specific tariff reduction 
modalities that are to be agreed in the Doha negotiations. Below we present data obtained 
from the AMAD database, which contains information on bound ad valorem tariff rates in 
agriculture, as well as information on TRQs.1 The bound rates are directly from Indonesia's 
commitment schedule, and the AMAD database contains 1331 Indonesian tariff lines at the 
HS-8 level. Figure 2.2 provides a picture of the tariff landscape. With the exception of a 
few peaks, the landscape is rather flat, with most bound tariffs in the range 40-60 per cent. 
The important exceptions are found in dairy, sugar, rice and beverages. See table 2.3 for 
summary statistics for the agricultural commodities only, and calculated at the HS-2 group 
level. We also estimate the current binding overhang, i.e. the difference between bound 
rates and the post-UR applied rates. The overhang is very large indeed and this reflects the 
fact that Indonesia has reduced its tariffs far below the URA commitments in the wake of 
the Asia crisis. The current low rates reflect an already liberal trade regime, with most tar-
iffs around 5 per cent. Two exceptions are sugar and rice where specific tariffs are applied, 
and in the case of rice also quantitative import restrictions. Another exception is (alcoholic) 
beverages.  
 The DDA negotiations on agriculture have introduced several approaches to achieve 
tariff reform. The European Union has favoured a Uruguay Round (UR) approach in its ag-
ricultural proposals, which defines as the goal an average cut in tariffs. The Uruguay 
Round has in practice led to the outcome that larger cuts were applied to tariffs that were 
already relatively low, while applying only modest reductions to high tariffs.  
 The USA and the CAIRNS group have proposed a formula approach. The fundamen-
tal difference to a UR approach is that a formula approach sets out rules to cut tariffs on 
each tariff-line. Specifically, these countries proposed to apply a Swiss formula approach 
on account that it achieves higher proportional cuts in higher tariff rates and results in a 
maximum ceiling tariff per tariff line. The Swiss formula is the most appropriate modality 
                                                 
1 AMAD is a collaborative effort between USDA/ERS, OECD, Agriculture Canada, UNCTAD, FAO and the 
EC. See www.amad.org. 
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for a reduction of address tariff escalation. The so-called Derbez text that emerged during 
the Cancun ministerial proposed to combine both a UR approach and a Swiss formula in a 
'blended' formula as a modality for market access negotiations. See Sawit (2004) for a de-
tailed analysis on Indonesia. The more recent July package of 2004 speaks about 'tiered 
formulae', without specifying exactly what this might look like. 
 Table 2.3 clearly shows that very substantial reductions in bound rates would be re-
quired to actually reduce Indonesian applied rates. Required reductions larger than 80 per 
cent are not uncommon, given the enormous binding overhang. Consequently, all of the 
suggested reduction modalities would have little impact on applied tariffs, but could reduce 
some of the bound rates substantially. The consequent reduction of binding overhang 
would limit Indonesia's future ability to raise tariffs above current levels.  
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Figure 2.2 Post Uruguay Round tariff landscape Indonesia, bound rates 
 Table 2.3 Bound and applied tariff rates imposed by Indonesia (per cent ad valorem) 
 
 
 Bound rate, % Applied rate, % Reduction of bound rates, required to  
   equalise bound and applied rate % 
 
 
HS 1996 Commodity group Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Mean 
 
 
01 Live animals 40 40 40 15 0 5 89 
02 Meat bovine and non-bovine 50 40 48 5 5 5 89 
03 Fish, fish products . . . 15 0 5 100 
04 Dairy, eggs and honey 210 40 90 5 0 4 92 
05 Hair and feather 40 40 40 5 0 4 91 
06 Ornamental plants 60 40 45 20 10 13 70 
07 Vegetables 50 40 45 5 0 5 89 
08 Nuts and fruits 60 40 46 5 5 5 89 
09 Coffee, tea and spices 60 40 44 5 5 5 88 
10 Rice and cereals a) 160 27 103 5 0 3 91 
11 Processed cereals 40 9 36 5 0 4 87 
 (flours, flakes) and starch 
12 Oilseeds 40 27 40 5 0 4 90 
13 Vegetable saps 40 30 39 5 0 4 89 
14 Bamboo, rattan and other plant fibres  40 40 40 5 0 2 95 
15 Vegetable oil and animal oils 60 35 42 10 0 5 88 
16 Animal products 40 40 40 5 5 5 88 
17 Sugar and -products b) 95 40 54 5 5 5 88 
18 Cocoa products 40 40 40 5 5 5 88 
19 Cereal products 60 40 41 5 5 5 88 
20 Processed vegetables and -fruits 60 40 49 5 5 5 89 
21 Soya sauce and other food  
 preparations 60 40 41 5 5 5 88 
22 Beverages 150 40 125 170 5 129 13 
23 Animal feed products 40 30 40 5 0 1 96 
24 Tobacco and - products 40 40 40 15 5 9 78 
 
 
Notes: Mean values per HS-2 group calculated from tariff-line data at HS-10 level; a) For rice the bound rate includes estimate of the ad-valorem equivalent of specific tariffs. The col-
umn 'applied rate' only contains the average of ad applied valorem tariffs. The current applied specific tariff is Rp 430/kg. At current world prices and exchange rates this is roughly 20 
per cent ad valorem. b) For sugar the bound rate includes estimate of the ad-valorem equivalent of specific tariffs. The column 'applied rate' only contains the average of applied ad 
valorem tariffs. The current applied specific tariff is Rp 700/kg for raw sugar (Rp 550/kg for cane sugar). At current world prices and exchange rates this amounts to roughly 30 per cent 
ad valorem. Source: Bound rates are from AMAD database, Applied rates have been obtained from Departement Pertanian. Calculations LEI. 
23 
 24
2.3 Model, data and scenarios 
 
2.3.1 Scenarios 
 
The challenge in constructing scenarios is to translate bound rates and bound AMS ceil-
ings, which are negotiated under DDA, into changes to the applied levels that can be 
incorporated in the modelling analysis. As usual one has to make simplifying assumptions 
to capture the spirit of the likely set of policy changes without being trapped into the de-
tails of the (legal) agreements. Our analysis of the impact of the DDA on the world and on 
Indonesia is structured around one central DDA scenario. On top of this scenario we run 
alternative variations to investigate some special issues, such as inclusion of Special Prod-
ucts (SP), and sugar and rice policies in Indonesia.  
 Our basic 'realistic' DDA scenario assumes the following with regard to the three pil-
lars in the agricultural negotiations: 
- Market access: 30 per cent reduction of applied levels of protection; 
- Domestic support: 5 per cent reduction of applied levels; 
- Export subsidy: 75 per cent reduction. 
 
 This scenario purports to reflect the current stance in the negotiations: substantial 
progress in market access albeit less in applied rates than in bound rates; limited progress 
on domestic support - despite strong commitments to lower AMS ceilings, perhaps - as the 
EU and the USA strive to expand the definition of the blue box and put increasing amounts 
of support in the green box; finally, we believe that very substantial reductions of export 
subsidies can be achieved in this round. See chapter 2 for more detail. 
 In most of the analysis we leave policies in all non-agricultural sectors untouched in 
order to concentrate on agricultural issues. But in order to assess the relative importance of 
agriculture versus industry and services we also conduct a liberalisation experiment that 
reduces industrial tariffs by the same 30 per cent as agricultural tariffs.  
 In one of the scenarios we simulate the potential impact of special products. We see 
little fundamental difference between 'sensitive products' proposed by OECD countries, 
and special products in developing countries. Special or sensitive are taken to be those 
products for which current levels of (bound) border protection are high. We than largely 
exempt sensitive/special products within this tariff range from liberalisation by assuming a 
'symbolic' 5 per cent cut on applied support or border measures. 
 
2.3.2 Model 
 
Our analysis uses calculations done with the general equilibrium model of the Global 
Trade Analysis Project. The GTAP model is a comparative static multi-sector multi-region 
general equilibrium model. Each country or region is depicted within the same structural 
model. The regional household to which the income of factors, tariff revenues and taxes 
are assigned represents the consumer side. The regional household allocates its income to 
three expenditure categories: private household expenditures, government expenditures 
and savings. For the consumption of the private household, the non-homothetic Constant 
Difference of Elasticities (CDE) function is applied.  
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 A representative producer for each sector of a country or region makes production 
decisions to maximise profits by choosing inputs of labour, capital, and intermediates to 
produce a single sector output. Producers can substitute primary factors for each other, 
modelled with a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functional form, while interme-
diates are used in fixed proportions (Leontief). In the case of crop production, farmers also 
make decisions on land allocation. Intermediate inputs are produced domestically or im-
ported, while primary factors cannot move across countries. Internationally traded 
commodities are assumed to be distinguished according to region of origin. Using this so-
called Armington assumption implies that for example wheat imported from the US is dif-
ferent from wheat imported from the EU, and trade flows in both varieties have their own 
price tag. A great advantage of the Armington assumption is the possibility to model bilat-
eral trade flows and bilateral trade policies.  
 The GTAP model includes two global institutions. All transports between regions are 
carried out by the international transport sector. The trading costs reflect the transaction 
costs involved in international trade, as well as the physical activity of transportation itself. 
Using transport inputs from all regions the international transport sector minimise its costs 
under the Cobb-Douglas technology. The second global institution is the global bank, 
which takes the savings from all regions and purchases investment goods in all regions de-
pending on the expected rates of return. The global bank guarantees that global savings are 
equal to global investments.  
 The welfare changes are measured by the equivalent variation. This tells us how 
much money can be taken away from the representative household, or must be given to the 
representative household, to make it as well off as without the policy change. In practice, 
the equivalent variation correlates with changes in real GDP. We also report changes in 
farming income. This is measured as change in value added derived from agricultural ac-
tivities, and hence excludes income from off-farm activities that the rural household may 
be engaged in. 
 Taxes are included in the theory of the model at several levels. Production taxes are 
placed on intermediate or primary inputs, or on output. Some trade taxes are modelled at 
the border. Additional internal taxes can be placed on domestic or imported intermediate 
inputs, and may be applied at differential rates that discriminate against imports. Trade pol-
icy instruments are represented as import or export taxes/subsidies. A detailed discussion 
of the basic algebraic model structure of the GTAP model can be found in Hertel (1997). 
Our model is implemented in GEMPACK, a software package designed for solving large 
applied general equilibrium models. The model is solved as an explicit non-linear system 
of equations, through techniques described by Harrison and Pearson (1996).  
 
2.3.3 Data 
 
We use the version 6.4 pre-release (September 2004) of the GTAP database that is bench-
marked to the year 2001. A special feature of the database is the trade protection 
information that comes from the MacMaps database. This is a joint effort by the Centre 
d'études Prospectives et d'information Internationales (CEPII) and the International Trade 
Centre (WTO/ITC). This database is used to convert tariffs applying to trade in products 
measured at a very disaggregate level (HS6) into their ad valorem equivalent. The import 
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protection measures include ad valorem tariffs, specific tariffs, quota, tariff rate quota re-
gimes, and anti-dumping duties. These are all converted into ad valorem equivalents. An 
important feature of this dataset is its inclusion of existing trade preferences, including 
GSP, ACP, AGOA and existing bilateral preferences. See Bouët et al (2004a) for a com-
prehensive documentation. 
 Information on domestic agricultural support is consistent with OECD producer Sup-
port Estimate information, but limited to OECD members and a few non-members.  
 The GTAP database contains economy-wide information 87 regions or individual 
countries and information on 57 commodities. For the purposes of this study we have ag-
gregated those into 11 regions and 10 commodities, listed in figure 2.3. See Appendix 1 for 
more details. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Aggregation of the database 
 
 
 Commodities Regions 
 
 
1 Rice Indonesia 
2 Sugar ASEAN (excl. Indonesia) 
3 Oilseeds China P.R. 
4 Grains Japan and Korea 
5 Vegetable Oils India 
6 Animal Products EU-25 
7 Other agriculture  North America (US and Canada) 
8 Food processing Brazil 
9 Manufactures South and Central America 
10 Services Australia and New Zealand 
11  All other countries 
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3. Impact of the Doha Development Agenda 
 
 
 
3.1 The world economy and Indonesia 
 
As negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda proceed, the prospects for strong 
economic benefits from the round get bleaker. More or less consistent estimates of static 
national income gains to the world economy were first estimated at 0.8 per cent (Francois 
et al. 2003, inspired by the Harbinson proposal); then at 0.1 per cent of GDP under a partial 
liberalisation based on the Derbez-text (Achterbosch et al., 2004); and at less than 0.07 per 
cent of global GDP in our current study inspired by the agreement of July 2004.1,2 
 
3.1.1 Global effects 
 
Below we report on the results of our model simulations under a realistic Doha scenario. 
On the global level, we estimate gains of USD 11 billion in agriculture, and of USD 10 bil-
lion in non-agriculture. Because of the small share of agriculture in the global economy, 
the relative gain is much bigger in agriculture (0.6 per cent of global agricultural GDP) 
than in non-agriculture (0.04 per cent of global non-agricultural GDP). Figure 3.1 reveals 
the distribution of national income gains over the agriculture economy and the non-
agriculture economy, by region. Typically, OECD countries receive gains in agriculture, 
while the developing countries have the stronger gains in the non-agriculture economy, i.e. 
in the activities of extraction, manufacturing, and services. 
 While almost all regions gain from taking part in the trade liberalisation, the spread is 
unequal over countries. Several developing regions score well above the global average, 
notably India, the ASEAN countries (excluding Indonesia), and Brazil. Of the OECD 
countries, those in the Far East (Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand) reap sub-
stantial gains, which are largely driven by agricultural reforms in Japan and Korea. The 
benefits in the EU are in line with the EU share in the global economy. We report a slight 
net loss for the US, giving the US little incentive to push hard on a deal. The national in-
come gain in Indonesia amounts to 0.3 per cent of GDP, far above the world average. Most 
gains occur in manufacturing and services. 
                                                 
1 The welfare calculations are based on a measure of equivalent variation (EV). 
2 Note that the current study makes use of an updated data set that provides a much better representation of 
preferential trade agreements and binding overhang in tariffs. Both preferences and 'water' are abundant in 
global trade, and they strongly reduce the global gains from improved market access. The Derbez-study by 
Achterbosch et al. did, however, already incorporate this effect. The gains reported in the text exclude the 
gains from increasing returns to scale, trade facilitation, or investment gains.  
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National income effects, liberalisation all sectors, DDA scenario
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Ind
on
es
ia
AS
EA
N
Ch
ina
 P
.R
.
Ja
pa
n a
nd
 K
ore
a
Ind
ia
EU
-25
No
rth
 Am
eri
ca
Br
az
il
So
uth
 an
d C
en
tra
l A
me
ric
a
Au
tra
lia
 an
d N
ew
 Ze
ala
nd
All
 ot
he
r c
ou
ntr
ies
WO
RL
D
%
 o
f V
al
ue
 a
dd
ed
-5000
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
m
ill
io
n 
U
S$ Agriculture
Non-Agriculture
Total in million US$ (right axis)
 
Figure 3.1 National income effects of a DDA liberalisation in all sectors 
 
 
 Under the agriculture negotiations, the July package reveals that little action is ex-
pected on the critical pillars of domestic support and market access. Consequently, the 
gains in agriculture are quite small. What is the contribution of the three pillars to these 
global gains? 94 per cent of gains relate to improved market access for agricultural prod-
ucts, 4 per cent to reduced domestic support and just 1 per cent to the downscaling of 
export competition policies. Note that these results are highly sensitive to the design of the 
scenarios, and specifically to the unambitious 5 per cent cut in domestic support that was 
assumed. What is revealing, nonetheless, is that the global gains from a 75 per cent reduc-
tion of export subsidies are quite modest. The export competition pillar covers much more 
than export subsidies, therefore our results will underestimate the potential gains from this 
pillar. The agriculture dossier under the Doha Round seems to have made most progress 
under a pillar that shows little potential for substantial welfare gains in developing coun-
tries. 
 
3.1.2 The Impact of the Doha Round on Indonesia 
 
Trade theory is straightforward in predicting that the gains from global liberalisation ac-
crue to those countries that remove their own distortions. Yet, Indonesia has quite a liberal 
trade regime, and few public means are allocated to support agricultural production or ex-
ports. This explains why the Doha round does little to boost Indonesian GDP (figure 3.1). 
There are more indirect ways, however, for the Indonesian economy to benefit from par-
ticipating in a global liberalisation effort. The matter returns below. First, we zoom in on 
the results of the liberalisation for Indonesia. 
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National income. We compare the contribution of policy changes to welfare in Indonesia 
and in the rest of ASEAN. For Indonesia the gains from improved market access have to 
compensate for the negative effect of a global reduction of domestic support and of export 
subsidies. The downward effect is due to the fact that Indonesia is a net importer in com-
modities that have their subsidies reduced. By consequence of the reduced support to rice, 
sugar and grains and the like, world market prices rise and import prices rise accordingly. 
Comparing the impact on Indonesia with the rest of ASEAN, what strikes is that the 
gain in the latter region from countries opening up their markets is about four times bigger. 
Basically, the other ASEAN countries are able to materialise more export gains than Indo-
nesia. The implication is that Indonesia - being a part of the global trading system – should 
aim to fulfil more of its export potential in order to derive firm benefits from the system.  
 
Sectoral impact. Figure 3.2 compares the changes in value of output in sectors of the Indo-
nesian economy. It should be read as an indication for changing patterns of specialisation 
after reform.  
 In Indonesia most food crops are largely unaffected, and there is a substantial expan-
sion in food production. Rice and sugar both contract slightly, thereby allowing resources 
to move into animal production and the oilseed/vegetable oil production, which both ex-
pand by 3 to 6 per cent. Looking just at quantities of output, there is 2.5 per cent growth in 
oilseeds and animal products, and over 6 per cent in vegetable oil.  
 The opportunities in animal products and vegetable oil relate to policy changes in Ja-
pan and Korea, which open up the highly protected market for rice, grains and oilseeds in 
these regions. ASEAN countries and North America fill the gap. More resources in these 
countries are absorbed by rice production, which opens up opportunities for Indonesia to 
increase its share on world markets for oilseed crops and vegetable oil. As the EU, Japan 
and Korea reduce their strong policies on dairy, beef and other animal products, Indonesia 
can be among the countries that expand their livestock sectors, albeit in strong competition 
with Brazil, Oceania, and other ASEAN countries.  
 Below we discuss in more detail the impact on agriculture of a DDA reform that cov-
ers only agriculture and food. 
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Percent change output volume, DDA liberalisation scenario all sectors, INDONESIA
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Figure 3.2 Output in Indonesia after Doha reform, by sector (per cent change) 
 
 
Farm income.1 There will, of course, be a consequent adjustment in the revenues from 
farming over the various sectors. The decline in rice and sugar output is partly compen-
sated by steeper prices. Figure 3.3 provides detail on the changes to real farmer income 
from a DDA reform, and to the drivers of change. Regarding the level of farm income, we 
find strong losses in the OECD countries that result from reduced levels of trade-distorting 
support; losses are fully compensated, however, through increased support under the Green 
Box. Farmers in emerging Asia - Indonesia included - gain under DDA, largely because of 
increased prices for their output (table 3.1). The results for Indonesia have to be interpreted 
with care because farming is often a part-time activity. In the lowland and upland area the 
share of agricultural (and fishing) activities in income is just about 50 per cent, in the 
coastal area it is just one-third.2 We report on changes to the income from farming activi-
ties only, and exclude the returns from fishing activities from the analysis. It will be clear 
that a proper analysis of the household impact from trade liberalisation will have to include 
the effect on off-farm income.  
 We find that average real income from farming (all activities) in Indonesia could in-
crease by 1.2 per cent after the DDA reform of global agricultural policies. For the 
                                                 
1 Change in real farm income is calculated as the CPI-deflated change in value added of agricultural activi-
ties. 
2 These data are ICASERD data for 2001. 
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potential gain to materialise, farmers will need to shift resources into the production of 
vegetable oil and animal products.  
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Figure 3.3 Impact of DDA on farm income, by region (per cent change) 
 
 
 The decomposition of the total change allows us to pinpoint the policies that drive 
change. Keep in mind our scenario design! The reduction of export subsidies and domestic 
support bears little impact outside the EU and Oceania. Nonetheless, Indonesian farmers 
benefit from rising market prices for their rice and oilseeds - as support policies become 
less distorting or decline, supply contracts, and prices rise. Increased market access is the 
biggest cause of adjustments worldwide. Indonesian export opportunities improve under 
the Asian rice domino; when Japan and Korea open up their markets for rice from the 
ASEAN region, Indonesian farmers get opportunities to step up their exports of animal 
products and vegetable oil, and take over market share from other ASEAN countries in 
these products. We find that a removal of protection on Indonesian agriculture slightly re-
duces farm income by about 0.4 per cent, a reflection of the minor contraction in rice and 
sugar production.  
 Most rural households are net buyers of food, i.e. consumption outweighs household 
supply. Although real farm income rises, the net impact on the rural household is likely to 
be negative. The income gain is partially based on the upward pressure on prices for agri-
cultural products. The net impact in the household depends on their food balance. Hertel et 
al. (2004) show that poor agricultural households in Indonesia are likely to witness a net 
income drop in the face of global liberalisation, as their food budget rises without being 
fully compensated by rising remuneration for their activities. 
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Table 3.1 Farm revenue after DDA reform (per cent change to base data) 
 
 
 Output Price Farm revenue 
 (1) (2) (1+2) 
 
 
Rice -0.67 0.24 -0.43 
Sugar -0.56 0.19 -0.37 
Oilseeds 2.36 1.4 3.76 
Cereals 0.29 0.68 0.97 
Vegetable oil 6.45 0.27 6.72 
Animal products 2.7 0.57 3.27 
 
 
Source: Model simulations. 
 
 
Employment and wages. Before we discuss the impact of reform on employment and 
wages, first a note on the specification of the labour market in the GTAP analysis. In the 
analysis we assume full employment of labour resources at all times in the analysis. This 
reflects our hypothesis that trade reform will not increase total demand for labour.1 In the 
agricultural economy in Indonesia, chances are bigger that trade reform will alter the struc-
ture of labour demand than its volume, basically because the labour force is already fully 
employed in farm and off-farm activities. The output changes reported above will affect 
the distribution over sectors. In addition, we expect the distribution of labour over the for-
mal and informal economy to change, an effect that we cannot quantify. 
 We find that labour demand follows the shifts in agricultural production, i.e. a slight 
reduction of the demand for labour in rice and sugar farming (and the processing of these 
crops) by less than 1 per cent; substantial increases of 2.5 to 4.5 per cent in the sectors 
vegetable oil and animal products. The agricultural economy specialises more into the sup-
ply of vegetable oil and animal products, which require more land and capital per unit of 
product, and less labour than rice and sugar. By consequence, wages decrease somewhat in 
comparison to wage levels in ASEAN and other East Asian regions, which experience the 
inversed output trend. In Indonesia the increase of land rents by 1 per cent transfers income 
from land labourers to land owners. As trade theory predicts, the reduced border protection 
on manufactures results in a decline of domestic capital prices. The decline is partly un-
done by an increased demand for capital from agriculture. 
 
The realisation of potential gains. The results indicate that a key challenge to Indonesia is 
to improve export performance in agriculture. Globally, enterprises in the food sector have 
incorporated consumer concerns and regulatory demands regarding health, quality and the 
environment into their production, marketing and distribution activities. The core of large 
retailers and trans-national 'agribusiness' corporations has introduced various technical 
specifications that govern quality and safety of local and imported food products, e.g. the 
                                                 
1 We assume full employment not only for labour but for land as well. This specification limits the scale of 
national income gains because we do not allow the endowment stock to grow. 
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guidelines from EurepGAP and British Retail Consortium.1 As tariffs decline in global 
food trade, such technical standards that importers impose become the more impeding 
trade barriers. They were once skilfully described as 'the emerging rocks in the ebbing 
tide.' 
 The organisational response has generally been to integrate buyers and sellers within 
so-called supply chains, which is controlled by the dominant link in the chain. In many 
cases this requires direct investments of the controlling link into the primary stages of pro-
duction. For such chains to reach out to agriculture in Indonesia requires quality and 
stability of supply, and a sound investment climate. The constructive attitude towards lib-
eralisation under the WTO signals a drive towards openness in Indonesia, which improves 
investment climate. Such intangible benefits from the WTO will support the value adding 
in agriculture through processing and exports. 
 
 
3.2 Exempting SPs from multilateral liberalisation  
 
In the previous section we looked at the effects of a possible outcome of the Doha round, 
but without taking into account the important issue of 'special products'. Members agreed 
in the July package that  
 'Developing country Members will have the flexibility to designate an appropriate 
number of products as Special Products, based on criteria of food security, livelihood secu-
rity and rural development needs. These products will be eligible for more flexible 
treatment. The criteria and treatment of these products will be further specified during the 
negotiation phase and will recognise the fundamental importance of Special Products to 
developing countries.' 
 At the same time, developed country members are also granted considerable leeway 
by allowing for so-called 'sensitive products' that will receive a more 'flexible' treatment 
with regard to market access commitments: 
 
 'Without undermining the overall objective of the tiered approach, Members may 
designate an appropriate number, to be negotiated, of tariff lines to be treated as sen-
sitive, taking account of existing commitments for these products.' 
 
And furthermore: 
 
'The extent of MFN-based tariff quota expansion and any required tariff reduction for 
all such products will be determined in the negotiations. A base for tariff quota ex-
pansion will be established, taking account of coherent and equitable criteria to be 
developed in the negotiations. In order not to undermine the objective of the tiered 
approach for all such products, MFN-based tariff quota expansion will be provided 
                                                 
1 In marketing, standards operate as a response to an increasing demand for differentiation and quality (in-
cluding safety) in food consumption. In production, standards are instrumental to achieving efficiency gains 
within a food chain, by reducing waste, co-ordination cost and incompatibility between links in the chain 
(Reardon et al., 2001). 
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under specific rules to be negotiated taking into account deviations from the tariff 
formula.' 
 
 It is interesting to note that this wording implies that developing countries will have 
to justify the designation of SPs according to food security criteria and similar considera-
tions, while the text speaks of no such justification in the case of sensitive products for 
developed countries. It seems evident that those products are deemed 'sensitive' that are 
currently subject to regulated trade under tariff rate quota (TRQ). 
 The exact parameters for designation of special products as well as sensitive products 
have to be negotiated, and it is at this point difficult/impossible to foresee the outcomes. 
However, we have undertaken to estimate the possible effects of exempting products from 
liberalisation efforts. Given the coarse nature of our commodity aggregation we are of 
course rather limited in the choice of products. In the simulation experiment, we therefore 
allow each region to designate at most one product as SP.  
 In order to arrive at some general principles for designation of SPs, we have used 
two simple indicators: 1) the existing level of border protection. Assuming that existing 
protection patterns reveals countries' preferences as to what they see as products that de-
serve protection, we select those agricultural products that currently have the highest 
applied tariffs. This indicator is combined with 2) the output weighted contribution to total 
farm income. This indicator should reveal the importance of the commodity concerned for 
rural incomes, and we choose those products that contribute the highest shares. All this 
leads us to a rather simple list: For all the Asian countries we assume Rice to be a special 
product, except for India, where we assume vegetable oils to be of particular importance. 
The EU is very likely to continue some form of restrictive sugar policies, in spite of recent 
moves towards reforms of the EU sugar regime. For North America and South-and Central 
America we assume animal products to be special. Finally, Brazil, the Oceania region and 
our heterogeneous 'rest of world' are not assumed to designate SPs. 
 
Modelling SPs. Our implementation of SPs is very straightforward, and is certainly an 
oversimplified representation of what will eventually be negotiated in the Doha round: we 
simply assume that members choose not to liberalise policies in their SPs. That is, they do 
not commit to further reductions in market access barriers, and if applicable no reduction 
of domestic support and no reduction of export subsidies. 
 Table 3.2 reveals the economy-wide welfare effects, from excluding SPs in the 
worldwide liberalisation efforts. The world as a whole would forego USD 2.2 billion, or 
about 20 per cent, relative to the original USD 11.2 billion gains (USD 21.1 billion includ-
ing manufactures) discussed in the previous section. The foregone income gain is 
unequally distributed, though. It is mainly the high income regions that have high current 
protection levels and choose not to liberalise their sensitive products that would potentially 
loose: Not reforming the EU25 sugar regime and maintaining the practice of export subsi-
disation implies a net loss of about USD 1.4 billion. Similarly, not opening the highly 
protected rice markets in Japan and Korea leads to a drop in welfare equivalent to USD 1.1 
billion in this region, with a negative welfare impact on rice exporting regions in Asia.  
 Even more disturbing is the effect on real farm incomes. While farm incomes in Ja-
pan and Korea and in the EU25 would rise relative to the original scenario, the low-income 
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regions in our model would see a (very) slight, and negligible drop in their farming in-
comes. Hence, while high-income regions would transfer resources from consumers and 
citizens to farmers in sensitive products, farmers in low-income countries would not ex-
perience significant income gains from the exclusion of SPs. The reason for this result is 
that the multilateral non-inclusion of products in the liberalisation efforts hampers export 
opportunities for low-income countries. This is especially evident in the rice (JAKO) and 
sugar (EU25) case. To Indonesia, the decline in export opportunities due to SPs is insig-
nificant in our model. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Welfare effect of designating Special Products (million US dollar) 
 
 
 Total EV Border  Export Domestic Real farm 
 Million USD protection subsidies support income (%) 
 1=2+3+4 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Indonesia -4 8 0 -0.02 
ASEAN -48 -78 31 -1 -0.9 
China 12 71 0 -0.06 
Japan/Korea -1,133 1,381 270 -22 1.11 
India 2 4 -2 0 -0.06 
EU25 -1,377 -120 1,273 15 1.37 
US/Canada -697 -685 -21 9 -0.83 
Brazil -17 39 -56 0 -0.22 
South/C. America -24 -114 89 1 -0.45 
Austr./New Zealand 49 161 -110 -3 0.21 
Rest of the World 946 -104 1,050 -1 -0.27 
Total -2,239 -2,293 57 -3 - 
 
 
Note: table reports changes in income due to SPs, relative to Doha scenario without SPs. 
Source: model simulations. 
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4. Possible Indonesian policy response 
 
 
 
4.1 Sugar self-sufficiency through domestic support 
 
Indonesia used to be a major sugar exporter in the past, but has turned into a sugar importer 
during the 1970s. Sugar consumption has outpaced domestic sugar production during the 
1990s. In 2002 Indonesia imported about 1.5 million metric tonnes, which accounted for 
almost half of consumption. Reduced sugar acreage and lower yields have contributed to 
declining sugar production. Attaining sugar self sufficiency is a declared policy objective 
in Indonesia. 
 Our model allows us to assess macro-economic consequences of such policies, and in 
this section we attempt such an evaluation. It must be kept in mind, however, that we are 
unable to take all the agronomic specificities of sugar production into account, and our re-
sults should be seen as a 'first cut' of analysis. 
 We model the self-sufficiency policy by specifying a model closure in which sugar 
self-sufficiency is exogenously imposed, and we let an output subsidy adjust freely to at-
tain that goal. Self-sufficiency is defined as the portion of total domestic consumption 
covered from domestic production. However, since the subsidy has to be financed, we im-
pose on the model a closed government budget. Revenue neutrality is obtained by tax 
replacement through a uniform tax on private consumption (or income) that is just suffi-
cient to cover the sugar subsidy. The scenario is implemented in a virtual 'post-Doha' 
world, i.e. on top of the base scenario used to assess the DDA. 
 Table 4.1 reports on the key outcomes of this scenario. While self-sufficiency would 
be an attainable goal according the model, it is also a very costly policy. The size of the 
output subsidy required to provide the incentives to expand domestic sugar production 
amounts to USD 1.7 billion, or 85 per cent of producer cost. This would lead to a more 
than 50 per cent rise in sugar output and to a sizeable drop in domestic market prices as 
domestic sugar becomes available at subsidised prices. Sugar expansion goes at the ex-
pense of rice output. Since our model assumes full employment of land (and other 
production factors), the additional sugar land has to come from other uses, mostly from ex-
isting rice land. The implied trade-off between sugar self-sufficiency and food security 
could be softened if unused land could be brought into sugar production. 
 The fiscal implications of the policy are not negligible. To finance the subsidy, a to-
tal tax of more than USD 2 billion is required, or 1.4 per cent of GDP. As is the case with 
all taxes, a dead-weight loss occurs if an output subsidy is afforded to sugar producers. In 
this case, we estimate the loss to be about USD 0.4 billion. 
 Of course the analysis could be further refined. For example, the effect of introduc-
ing higher yielding varieties could be included as well as the effects of expanding sugar 
acreage into hitherto unused areas. Such elaborations would require more information on 
the agronomic specificities as well as information on the cost of these measures.  
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Table 4.1 Effects of sugar self-sufficiency policy 
 
 
Impact on sugar and land markets 
 
 
Output subsidy per unit, % of producer cost 85 
Output volume, % change 54 
Domestic market price, % change -56 
Producer price, % change (*) -12 
Producer revenue, % change 42 
Land share sugar 4% -> 7% 
Land share rice 27% -> 26% 
 
Fiscal implications 
Total subsidy, USD 1.7 billion 
Total consumer tax revenue, USD 2.1 billion 
Dead-weight loss 0.4 billion 
Consumption tax, % of GDP 1.4 
 
 
Note: (*) The change in producer price refers to both raw and processed sugar. The drop in the combined 
price is caused by cheaper sugar input prices (due to the subsidy) into sugar processing. 
Source: model calculations. 
 
 
4.2 Managing effects on the domestic rice sector through SSM border measures 
 
Chapter 3 has described that under the DDA scenario, rice imports step up by 20 per cent 
and domestic supply contracts. This section describes two policy options for the Indone-
sian government to manage these effects, in order to stabilise the rice sector. The first 
policy option is stabilisation of rice farm income, while the second option is stabilisation of 
domestic prices. Stabilisation of the domestic rice economy is of particular concern to In-
donesian policy makers, as rice occupies such an important position in the rural economy 
and in national food security. As a major rice importing country, the domestic price of 
milled rice is highly influence by the world market. The influence became more significant 
as the world market price of rice declined since the mid 1990s and in the wake of the Indo-
nesian abolition of rice import restrictions in 1998. Rice imports are also a very seasonal 
phenomenon, with domestic rice production covering consumption during most months of 
the year, and excess demand occurring during the period October to February.  
 In order to cushion the domestic rice economy from world market volatilities and es-
pecially from downward price movements, policy makers might seek recourse to 
temporary trade policy measures such as import restrictions and raised tariffs. The existing 
GATT framework provides instruments to temporarily raise protection against imports. 
Numerous proposals for agricultural safeguard mechanisms as part of special and differen-
tial treatment for developing countries have been made in the ongoing the Doha round. See 
Ruffer and Vergano (2002) for a useful discussion and a summary. 
 The argument that developing countries should have access to a special safeguard ar-
rangement is based on two main considerations. First, the vulnerability of producers, and 
especially low-income and resource-poor producers, to a sharp drop in market prices 
caused either by unexpectedly low world market prices or a surge in imports. Second the 
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absence of alternative risk management and safety net instruments. Furthermore the desire 
for a developing country safeguard is supported by a perception that there is an imbalance 
in the current Agreement in Agriculture (AoA) because the use of the Special Safeguard 
(Article 5) is mainly confined to developed countries since it was limited to countries 
which chose the tariffication option in making their tariff commitments. Many developing 
countries opted for ceiling bindings instead of bound rates, and consequently did not have 
access to the Special Safeguard. 
 Safeguards are an alternative to requesting high bound tariffs for stabilisation pur-
poses. To the extent that countries will be able to negotiate higher bound tariffs on some 
agricultural products, as part of the negotiations on SPs, the case for a safeguard mecha-
nism in addition is diminished. However, if bound rates come down then it might be 
worthwhile to consider safeguard mechanisms. 
 
4.2.1 Farm income stabilisation through variable tariffs 
 
We simulate world price drops through increased harvest in the main rice exporting region, 
ASEAN (Thailand). The production increase is technically implemented through a neutral 
TFP shock in that region. A variable import tariff adjusts such that producer revenues from 
rice farming are kept constant in face of the dropping world prices. Hence, if world rice 
prices drop sharply, a high tariff will be needed to avoid the influx of cheaper imports, and 
hence to avoid large downward impact on domestic prices. In order to get an idea about the 
possible range of responses to variable world prices, we use a Systematic Sensitivity 
Analysis to calculate means and variances of all the endogenous variables in our model.  
 Table 4.2 presents key results from this analysis. The mean simulated world price 
drop for rice imported into Indonesia equals -9.5 per cent, with a standard deviation of 3.0 
per cent. In order to compensate for these drops, the mean change of the power of the im-
port tariff has to be 16.6 per cent. The lower panel of the table and figure 4.1 show the 
ranges in which the tariff level and the domestic price move, assuming a 75 per cent confi-
dence interval.1 In case of large simulated price drops of almost -16 per cent, a tariff level 
of 56 per cent is required to stabilise farm incomes, implying more than a doubling from 
the current level of 25 per cent, but well within the bound rate agreed under the URAA. At 
the low end, a tariff of 35 per cent would suffice.  
                                                 
1 We use Chebychev's inequality to establish the confidence intervals. This does not imply any prior assump-
tions as to the nature of the underlying distribution of the variables.  
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Table 4.2 World price volatility and rice income stabilisers 
 
 
 Mean Standard deviation 
 
 
Change in world price, % -9.5 3.0 
Change in power of tariff, % 16.6 4.2 
 
 High Mean Low 
World Price change % -15.6 -9.5 -3.5 
Tariff level, ad valorem % 56 46 35 
Domestic price USD/100Kg 30 30 30 
 
 
Source: Model simulations. 
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Figure 4.1 World price volatility and rice income stabilisers 
 
 
4.2.2 Stabilising domestic prices through variable tariffs 
 
The first policy option discussed above has as its objective the stabilisation of rice farmer 
incomes. This objective, which is also implicitly taken to be our 'trigger' to invoke the 
safeguard mechanism is rather difficult to measure and operationalise in practice. It is rela-
tively easier to monitor domestic prices and border prices and to invoke the safeguard if 
prices drop below a certain threshold level. In fact, the price trigger is also one of the 
mechanisms under the current Agricultural Safeguard under the Uruguay round Agree-
ment. The other mechanism is a volume trigger. In this section we employ a price-based 
trigger to counter-act falling rice world prices. 
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Figure 4.2 Managing rice imports with a price-triggered safeguard 
 
 
 Technically, we again simulate a world price drop through increased harvest in the 
main rice-exporting region, ASEAN (Thailand). A variable import tariff adjusts such that 
the ratio of domestic to foreign prices remains constant at pre-simulation levels. Hence, the 
drop in world prices does not induce Indonesian consumers to switch to imports, as they do 
not experience ('see') the price differential.  
 Figure 4.2 shows the effects of the safeguard on the change in the volume of rice im-
ports. The variable tariff clearly neutralises the effect of 'bumper harvest ASEAN' that 
would lead to an increased supply of rice at cheaper prices, and would lead to a 40 per cent 
rise of imports above the levels of our virtual post-DDA world. The DDA simulation alone 
would lead to a 20 per cent rise in rice imports, most of which caused by lower Indonesian 
tariffs on rice. 
 Figure 4.3 further decomposes the income effects of this policy into the various fac-
tors involved. Indonesia's own policy changes under the simulated DDA round simulation 
lead to a slight drop in aggregate farm income (-0.35 per cent) while policy changes by 
other countries would raise both farm income (+1.55 per cent) and raise national income 
(+USD 20.16 million). The bumper harvest in the ASEAN region would reduce farm in-
comes (-0.39 per cent) but raise national incomes, as cheaper rice benefits consumers. The 
price stabilisation almost fully compensates for the reduced farm income caused by compe-
tition from cheaper rice incomes, but the loss in national income due to raised imports 
tariffs is limited because higher tax revenues partly compensate for the reduced availability 
of cheaper rice to consumers.  
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Figure 4.3 National income and farm income under a price-triggered safeguard 
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5. Conclusions 
 
 
 
This paper has employed a large-scale economic model to quantify potential interests of 
Indonesia in the agricultural negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda. As with 
all such modelling studies the analysis represents an abstraction from many details and 
could be refined in various ways. From our analysis we can draw a number of conclusions. 
 
Model results. Indonesia's quite liberal trade regime emerged in the wake of the financial 
crisis in Asia during the late 1990s. Given low applied protection in Indonesia, we estimate 
only small economy-wide welfare (efficiency) gains from own reforms. In fact, all effects 
of trade reform are rather small because the integration of Indonesian agriculture with 
global markets is quite limited. Small-simulated drops in rice and sugar incomes are more 
than compensated through expansion in vegetable oils and animal products. Overall, this 
results in a small improvement of farmers' incomes. The realisation of these potential bene-
fits depends on the ability to shift resources into these promising areas of agricultural 
production. Indonesia's active participation in the DDA might facilitate this process of 
change through its impact on the investment climate in the country. 
 
Trade negotiations. Our results quantify a range of interests of Indonesia in the agriculture 
negotiations. Some are on the defensive side, aimed at conserving flexibility for protection-
ist policies. Others are on the offensive side, and relate to the realisation of export potential 
through domestic transformation of agriculture, and improved access to export markets. 
 Defensive interests of Indonesia in the negotiations include: (i) Current applied tar-
iffs are very low, while bound rates are high. The resulting binding overhang gives a lot of 
flexibility to increase border protection should Indonesia want to protect domestic activi-
ties from world markets. (ii) Formula reductions of bound rates will have a limited impact 
on applied rates. A tiered formula retains flexibility, especially if 'special products' are to 
be exempted from reduction commitments. (iii) In rice we find a double-digit rise of im-
ports in the DDA scenario due to reduced border protection at slightly rising world prices. 
The import surge could be mitigated through designating rice as special product (SP). The 
cost of this price-based policy in terms of national income loss is limited, while an import 
ban or restrictive quota regime would entail significant welfare losses. Not only would an 
import ban lead to losses in consumer welfare, through more restricted availability, but the 
country would also forego tariff revenues. Criteria design for SPs is a potential deadlock, 
however. (iv) Safeguards are an alternative to requesting high bound tariffs for stabilisation 
purposes. To the extent that Indonesia will be able to negotiate higher bound tariffs on 
some agricultural products, the case for a safeguard mechanism in addition is diminished. 
However, if bound rates come down then it might be worthwhile to consider safeguard 
mechanisms. 
 Offensive interests in the negotiations include: (i) Domestic support reduction by 
OECD is estimated to have small negative impacts on the net importing Indonesian econ-
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omy through higher import prices. However, higher world sugar prices that would result 
from some reforms in OECD countries would support expansion of the sugar sector in In-
donesia. (ii) The simulations show a limited effect on Indonesia of improved market access 
to other countries. The limited realisation of export potential is due to current specialisation 
pattern. Diversification into first-stage processing to add value to primary products would 
lead to positive prospects in animal products and vegetable oils. (iii) If aggressive opening 
of other markets is attained, Indonesia will also have to lower its own bound rates, hence 
loosing some flexibility. This flexibility can be regained through pushing for a Special 
Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) and/or Special Products (SP). Alternatively, maintaining 
global protection levels would also leave Indonesia's flexibility untouched, but this comes 
at the cost of foregoing future benefits of opening markets. 
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Appendix 1 Grouping of Sectors and Regions 
 
 
 
 Table A1.1 Commodity grouping of the GTAP database 
 
Current grouping (10-sectors) GTAP database (64-sectors ) 
No. Code Commodities No. Code Commodities 
     
1 Rice Paddy rice,  
processed rice 
1 pdr Paddy rice 
   23 pcr Processed rice 
     
2 Sugar Sugar cane, sugar beet, 
sugar 
6 c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet 
   24 sgr Sugar 
     
3 Osd Oilseeds 5 osd Oil seeds 
     
4 Gro Cereal grains nec 3 gro Cereal grains nec 
     
5 Vol Vegetable oils and fats 21 vol Vegetable oils and fats 
     
6 Anpr Animal products 9 ctl Cattle,sheep,goats,horses 
   10 oap Animal products nec 
   11 rmk Raw milk 
   12 wol Wool, silk-worm cocoons 
   19 cmt Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse 
   20 omt Meat products nec 
   22 mil Dairy products 
     
7 Oagri Other agricultural 
products 
2 wht Wheat 
   4 v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
   7 pfb Plant-based fibers 
   8 ocr Crops nec 
      
8 Ofood Other food products 25 ofd Food products nec 
   26 b_t Beverages and tobacco products 
      
9 Mnfcs Manufactures 13 frs Forestry 
   14 fsh Fishing 
   15 coa Coal 
   16 oil Oil 
   17 gas Gas 
   18 omn Minerals nec 
   27 tex Textiles 
   28 wap Wearing apparel 
   29 lea Leather products 
   30 lum Wood products 
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   31 ppp Paper products, publishing 
   32 p_c Petroleum, coal products 
   33 crp Chemical, rubber, plastic prods 
   34 nmm Mineral products nec 
   35 i_s Ferrous metals 
   36 nfm Metals nec 
   37 fmp Metal products 
   38 mvh Motor vehicles and parts 
   39 otn Transport equipment nec 
   40 ele Electronic equipment 
   41 ome Machinery and equipment nec 
   42 omf Manufactures nec 
      
10 Svces Services 43 ely Electricity 
   44 gdt Gas manufacture, distribution 
   45 wtr Water 
   46 cns Construction 
   47 trd Trade 
   48 otp Transport nec 
   49 wtp Sea transport 
   50 atp Air transport 
   51 cmn Communication 
   52 ofi Financial services nec 
   53 isr Insurance 
   54 obs Business services nec 
   55 ros Recreation and other services 
   56 osg PubAd-
min/Defence/Health/Educat 
   57 dwe Dwellings 
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Table A1.2 Regional grouping of the GTAP database 
 
Current grouping (10 regions) GTAP database (87 regions) 
No. Code Country/region No. Code Country/region 
      
1 INDON Indonesia 10 idn Indonesia 
      
2 ASEAN ASEAN 11 mys Malaysia 
   12 phl Philippines 
   13 sgp Singapore 
   14 tha Thailand 
   15 vnm Vietnam 
   16 xse Rest of  
Southeast Asia 
      
3 CHINA China,  
Hong Kong 
4 chn China 
   5 hkg Hong Kong 
      
4 JAKO Japan, Korea 6 jpn Japan 
   7 kor Korea 
      
5 INDIA India 18 ind India 
      
6 EU25 European  
Union 
37 aut Austria 
   38 bel Belgium 
   39 dnk Denmark 
   40 fin Finland 
   41 fra France 
   42 deu Germany 
   43 gbr United Kingdom 
   44 grc Greece 
   45 irl Ireland 
   46 ita Italy 
   47 lux Luxembourg 
   48 nld Netherlands 
   49 prt Portugal 
   50 esp Spain 
   51 swe Sweden 
   58 cyp Cyprus 
   59 cze Czech Republic 
   60 hun Hungary 
   61 mlt Malta 
   62 pol Poland 
   64 svk Slovakia 
   65 svn Slovenia 
   66 est Estonia 
   67 lva Latvia 
   68 ltu Lithuania 
      
7 NAME North America 21 can Canada 
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   22 usa United States 
      
8 BRAZ Brazil 30 bra Brazil 
      
9 SCAM Rest South and 
Central  
America 
23 mex Mexico 
   24 xna Rest of North Amer-
ica 
   25 col Colombia 
   26 per Peru 
   27 ven Venezuela 
   28 xap Rest of Andean Pact 
   29 arg Argentina 
   31 chl Chile 
   32 ury Uruguay 
   33 xsm Rest of South  
America 
   34 xca Central America 
   35 xfa Rest of FTAA 
   36 xcb Rest of the  
Caribbean 
      
10 OCEA Oceania 1 aus Australia 
   2 nzl New Zealand 
   3 xoc Rest of Oceania 
      
11 ROW All other  
regions 
8 twn Taiwan 
   9 xea Rest of East Asia 
   17 bgd Bangladesh 
   19 lka Sri Lanka 
   20 xsa Rest of South Asia 
   52 che Switzerland 
   53 xef Rest of EFTA 
   54 xer Rest of Europe 
   55 alb Albania 
   56 bgr Bulgaria 
   57 hrv Croatia 
   63 rom Romania 
   69 rus Russian  
Federation 
   70 xsu Rest of Former  
Soviet Union 
   71 tur Turkey 
   72 xme Rest of Middle East 
   73 mar Morocco 
   74 tun Tunisia 
   75 xnf Rest of North Africa 
   76 bwa Botswana 
   77 zaf South Africa 
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   78 xsc Rest of South  
African CU 
   79 mwi Malawi 
   80 moz Mozambique 
   81 tza Tanzania 
   82 zmb Zambia 
   83 zwe Zimbabwe 
   84 xsd Rest of SADC 
   85 mdg Madagascar 
   86 uga Uganda 
   87 xss Rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
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Appendix 2 Checking the Validity of the GTAP Database  
   for Indonesia 
 
 
To get indication on the validity of our GTAP simulation results, we checked the validity 
of the GTAP 6.4 database. The spreadsheet below shows the results from comparing the 
data from the 2000 input output table for Indonesia (IO) to the 2001 GTAP 6.4 database. 
The check comprised two steps. (1) Align the 175 sector IO table to the 10-commodity ag-
gregation that we apply in the current analysis. (2) Compare corresponding values for the 
most critical elements for the GTAP analyses, i.e. the composition of value added; the 
structure of intermediate deliveries; the absorption of output over demand categories; and 
national income (GDP). For each corresponding value 'x' in the spreadsheet, we calculate:  
 
xi = IOi - GTAPi 
 
 which implies that if : 
 
x>0 GTAP underestimates IO table    
x<0 GTAP overestimates IO table  
 
 Our criterion for validity is that for all |x|>0.1, the validity is debatable; all deviations 
by more than 10 per cent are marked in the spreadsheet by a shaded cell. 
 We conclude that overall validity is acceptable. A full revision of data for Indonesia 
is very much desirable given the substantial divergence in factor shares, intermediate de-
liveries, and GDP. Five issues should specifically be addressed: 
 
a) GTAP allocates 20-30 per cent higher labour shares in agriculture. Pearson et al. 
(2003) report labour shares in the range of 20-30 per cent; 
b) Distribution of value added over sectors in both tables match; 
c) Labour costs to the sector is overestimated by the GTAP database especially in rice 
and cereals; capital costs are large in GTAP for oilseeds, cereal and oagri; 
d) GTAP registers about 20 per cent more intermediate inputs in oilseeds than the IO 
(25 per cent on the diagonal), and 20 per cent less in VegOil. Probably due to the fact 
that primary processing of soya bean (oil) is included in OtherFood; 
e) Absorption of goods and services in agriculture looks excellent. Export demand is 
overestimated in GTAP at the expense of services. 
 55
Table A2.1 Data check 
 
VALUE ADDED
Net value added (mRice Sugar Oilseeds Cereals VegOil AnProd OthAgri OthFood ManufactureServices Total intermediate input
Labour -916 -289 -36 -142 383 343 -348 415 812 4.363 4.583
Capital 2.372 -492 515 530 -517 275 2.628 210 1.502 6.372 13.397
Net value added 1.455 -781 480 387 -134 618 2.280 625 2.314 10.735 17.980
Factor shares (%)
Labour -0,223 -0,008 -0,215 -0,284 0,185 0,025 -0,131 0,042 0,006 0,003 -0,008 a)
Capital 0,223 0,008 0,215 0,284 -0,185 -0,024 0,131 -0,042 -0,005 -0,003 0,008
Total 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000
Distribution of value-added over sectors (%)
Labour -0,023 -0,007 -0,001 -0,004 0,007 0,004 -0,014 0,006 -0,009 0,042 0,000 b)
Capital 0,018 -0,006 0,004 0,004 -0,007 0,000 0,019 -0,003 -0,040 0,012 0,000
Total 0,005 -0,006 0,003 0,002 -0,003 0,001 0,008 -0,001 -0,029 0,021 0,000
Capital includes operating surplus and depreciation
INTERMEDIATE DELIVERIES
0,000 Rice Sugar Oilseeds Cereals VegOil AnProd OthAgri OthFood ManufactureServices Total intermediate input
Labour -0,103 -0,031 -0,082 -0,242 0,030 -0,001 -0,078 0,007 0,011 -0,022 0,006 c)
Capital 0,095 -0,046 0,273 0,236 -0,190 -0,029 0,152 -0,033 0,025 -0,040 0,024
Rice 0,008 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,006 0,000 -0,003 0,000 -0,002 0,004
Sugar 0,000 0,117 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 -0,011 0,000 -0,001 -0,001
Oilseeds 0,000 0,000 -0,265 0,000 0,005 0,007 0,000 0,018 0,001 0,000 0,001
Cereals 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,019 0,012 0,002 0,000 0,027 0,000 0,000 0,002
VegOil 0,000 -0,002 -0,016 0,000 0,094 0,007 -0,021 0,007 0,000 -0,001 0,003
AnProd 0,001 0,000 0,002 0,007 -0,001 -0,055 0,005 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001
OthAgri 0,000 0,003 -0,001 0,000 0,066 -0,004 -0,043 -0,079 0,010 0,004 0,002
OthFood 0,000 -0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,101 0,001 0,035 0,002 0,003 0,009
Manufactures 0,007 -0,035 0,048 -0,025 -0,046 -0,017 -0,027 -0,026 -0,028 0,017 -0,026
Services -0,007 -0,005 0,040 0,006 0,030 -0,004 0,013 0,057 -0,022 0,043 -0,025
Total 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Total intermediate 0,008 0,077 -0,192 0,006 0,160 0,030 -0,074 0,026 -0,036 0,062 -0,030 d)
ABSORPTION
Final 
domestic 
demand
total 
exports 
(fob)
Priv. Cons Gov. Cons Investment Stock changtotal EEXT total demand
6 Rice 1.765 0 0 215 1.980 -25 1.955
7 Sugar 111 0 0 -39 71 -10 61
8 Osd -74 0 0 0 -75 -7 -81
9 Gro 323 0 0 31 354 -2 352
10 Vol 632 0 0 14 646 210 856
11 Anpr 1.812 0 22 -95 1.740 -423 1.316
12 Oagri 1.274 0 0 55 1.329 -504 825
13 Ofood 1.520 0 0 -40 1.480 -714 766
14 Mnfcs 4.063 0 6.179 1.893 12.136 -9.759 2.377
15 Svces 3.561 739 26.193 198 30.691 8.221 38.912
Total 14.986 739 32.395 2.232 50.351 -3.012 47.339
Final domestotal exports (fob)
Priv. Cons Gov. Cons Investment Stock changtotal EEXT total demand
6 Rice -0,025 0,000 0,000 0,029 0,025 -0,005 0,000
7 Sugar 0,037 0,000 0,000 -0,029 -0,037 -0,008 0,000
8 Osd 0,010 0,000 0,000 -0,001 -0,010 -0,010 0,000
9 Gro -0,032 0,000 0,000 0,043 0,032 -0,011 0,000
10 Vol 0,055 0,000 0,000 0,004 -0,055 -0,059 0,000
11 Anpr 0,094 0,000 0,003 -0,014 -0,098 -0,083 0,000
12 Oagri 0,093 0,000 0,000 0,007 -0,093 -0,100 0,000
13 Ofood 0,062 0,000 0,000 -0,003 -0,062 -0,059 0,000
14 Mnfcs 0,043 0,000 0,077 0,024 -0,120 -0,144 0,000
15 Svces -0,271 -0,072 0,285 0,002 0,058 0,056 0,000 e)
Total -0,044 -0,010 0,151 0,010 -0,097 -0,107 0,000
GDP USD 2001 million Rp billion Rp/USD a)
from final demand n.a n.a 8.416
from VA 17.979 1.298.751.834
from GDP table -9.306 1.143.353.105
a) average rate for 2000. source: FX history, conversion table: USD to IDR (interbank rate)  
 
